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SHUSHING THE NEW AESTHETIC 
VOCABULARY: APPROPRIATION ART UNDER 
THE CANADIAN COPYRIGHT REGIME
In adopting pre-existing works as source material to convey new meanings and 
understandings, appropriation art is an integral avenue of artistic expression. 
However, the narrow fair dealing exception provides little protection to artists 
who engage in this form of social commentary, a form which necessitates 
reproducing the original copyrighted work for a successful referential analysis. 
This paper will explore the unique challenge that appropriation art poses to the 
Canadian copyright law. As a preliminary matter, the author will discuss the 
conceptual basis behind this aesthetic practice and situate it within traditional 
notions of authorship. The author moves on to examine the current Canadian 
jurisprudence under the case of Michelin and compares this approach to 
American developments under its broader fair use doctrine. It is argued that 
the fate of appropriation art as a legally valid practice largely depends on the 
recognized policy objectives of a given copyright regime. While developments 
in Théberge and CCH Canadian Ltd. seem to offer hope to the appropriation 
artist, short of a possible Charter challenge to the Copyright Act, they do little 
to change the exhaustive nature of the fair dealing exceptions. The author 
concludes that the most viable solution to accommodating appropriation art 
in the Canadian copyright regime is through statutory reform akin to the more 
flexible fair use standard.  
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† Karen Lowe is in her third year of the LL.B. Programme at Dalhousie University. She 
attended the University of Victoria’s International Intellectual Property Programme in the 
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All authorship is fertilized by the work of prior authors, and the 
echoes of old work in new work extend beyond ideas and concepts to 
a wealth of expressive details. Indeed, authorship is the transformation 
and recombination of expressions into new molds, the recasting and 
revision of details into different shapes. What others have expressed, 
and the ways they have expressed it, are the essential building blocks 
of any creative medium…The use of the work of other authors in one’s 
own work inheres in the authorship process.1
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the 
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial 
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At one 
extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. 
Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had 
learned the new language in which their author spoke.2
INTRODUCTION
The great Spanish painter, Pablo Picasso, once remarked, “[t]he artist is a 
receptacle for the emotions that come from all over the place: from the sky, 
from the earth, from a scrap of paper, from a passing shape, from a spider’s 
web”.3 Artists have historically drawn inspiration from their surroundings, 
each new landscape and vista being a potential starting point for artistic 
expression to take flight. However, given the increasingly ubiquitous nature 
of commercial and mass-mediated images in our daily lives, it should not 
come as a surprise that these images are integral to the artistic expressions of 
our times. The ever-imposing billboards, the omnipresent advertisements in 
bathroom stalls, classrooms, and ‘Google Earth’ searches – these make up the 
new aesthetic vocabulary in an emerging postmodern artistic practice coined 
‘appropriation art’.4 
1  Jessica Litman, “Copyright as Mythe” (1991) 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 235 at 243-44.
2  Bleistein v. Donaldson Lothography Co., 188 U.S. 239 at 251 (1903) [Bleistein].
3  “Pablo Picasso Quotes,” online: Artquotes.net < http://www.artquotes.net/masters/
picasso_quotes.htm>.
4 See also John Carlin, “Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property 
Law” (1988) 13 Colum.-V.L.A. J.L. & Arts 103 at para 111:“In the present century, 
culture functions as the ideal artistic referent…contemporary artists should be free to 
reproduce our ‘nature’ even if some of it is made of commercial signs and imagery 
protected by copyright”.
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Appropriation art can be described as “a postmodern technique using images 
fundamental to a culture (and therefore not created by the artist, who creates 
from the standpoint of the outsider) to make a point about that culture”.5 It 
is a practice that functions by using pre-existing works, oftentimes entire 
works, and adopting them as source material to convey new messages and 
understandings. Appropriation has been well-accepted in the art world as 
a valid and significant technique, utilized by noted artists including French 
artist Marcel Duchamp, and the influential American pop-artist, Andy 
Warhol.6 However, what may be called ‘appropriating’ or ‘borrowing’ in the 
art world raises legal concerns respecting copyright infringement, especially 
because the elements that comprise the new aesthetic vocabulary are often 
copyrighted works. The practice of appropriation necessarily competes with 
copyright interests, because the law prohibits substantial reproduction of 
copyrighted works.7 Consequently, the question in most cases is not whether 
the copyright holder’s right has been infringed, but rather, whether the 
artist can show her dealing is nevertheless allowable under the fair dealing 
exception.
Canadian copyright jurisprudence in respect to appropriation works is 
a murky, uncharted terrain, owing largely to the extremely narrow scope 
of the fair dealing exceptions under the Copyright Act.8 The exhaustive list 
5  Niels B. Schaumann, “An Artist’s Privilege” (1997) 15 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 249 at 
252 [Schaumann]. 
6  Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q. is a direct copy of Leonardo’s Mona Lisa with a moustache 
painted on. It is said to be humorous comment on the original artist’s homosexuality. 
Warhol was an American artist who is known for his paintings of American house hold 
products such as Campbell’s Soup (1968), as well as his mass-produced silkscreen prints of 
famous persons. See Elton Fukumoto, “The Author Effect After the ‘Death of the Author’: 
Copyright in a Post-modern Age” (1997) 72 Wash. L. Rev. 903 at 919 [Fukumoto].  
7  Appropriation art also raises issues of trademark and moral rights issues. See e.g. 
Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions 353 F.3d. 792 (9th Circ. 2003)[Mattel]. The 
Court held the artist’s use of Mattel’s Barbie dolls in his photographs did not infringe the 
plaintiff’s trademark because any public interest in free and artistic expression outweighed 
the plaintiff’s interest in any potential consumer confusion.  See also Patricia Loughlan, 
“Moral Rights (A View from the Town Square)” (2000) Media & Arts Law Review 1, 
where the author argues that, “moral rights, by canonizing the artist and consecrating the 
work, may function to separate the discursive practices of art from daily life and thereby 
inhibits art’s cultural and political power”.
8  R.S.C. 1985, C-42 [Copyright Act or Act].
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of protected purposes under fair dealing does not include parody, a purpose 
that has been successfully relied upon as a defence by American artists under 
the broader and more flexible fair use doctrine. The current uncertainty 
stifles artistic expression, as hesitant Canadian artists fear being exposed to 
liability.  They must tread lightly in deciding what ‘mirror’ to use in order 
to evince a telling social commentary while also according with the law.  At 
the same time, the ever-shrinking public domain fails to benefit from these 
invaluable intellectual works. As Justice Leval enunciated, “[m]onopoly 
protection of intellectual property that impede[s] referential analysis and the 
development of new ideas out of old would strangle the creative process”.9
This paper will explore the unique challenge that appropriation art poses to 
the Canadian copyright regime, and argue that the Canadian fair dealing 
provisions must be reformed to accommodate appropriation practices as 
integral avenues of artistic expression. Part I will discuss the conceptual basis 
of appropriation art, and how it is situated in direct opposition to copyright 
law. Part II will examine the Canadian jurisprudence on appropriation art in 
the leading decision of Cie Générale des Éstablissements Michelin-Michelin 
& Cie v. C.A.W., 10 and compare this approach to American developments 
under its fair use doctrine. It will discuss how the fate of appropriation art as 
a legally valid practice largely depends on the recognized policy objectives 
of a given copyright regime. Part III will survey the available avenues to 
ameliorate the Canadian jurisprudence with that of the United States, in light 
of recent developments by the Supreme Court of Canada. It will conclude 
that despite these promising developments, the only realistic solution is that 
of parliamentary reform. 
9  Pierre J. Leval, J., “Toward a Fair Use Standard” (1990) Harv. L. Rev. 1105 at 1109 
[Leval]. Justice Leval’s article was formative in the development of the transformative 
use test under the fair use doctrine, and has been copiously cited by subsequent American 
case law. 
10  (1996), 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348 (F.C.T.D.) [Michelin].
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PART I: A PRIMER ON APPROPRATION ART  
AS POSTMODERN PRACTICE
An examination of appropriation art reveals a number of conceptual 
frameworks that provide an impetus to this particular type of aesthetic 
practice. Firstly, appropriation art stands as a form of social critique. It is a 
commentary that sheds light on the pervasive nature of commercial images 
and how the prevalence of mass media in our society has come to dominate 
our understandings and the way in which we make meaning in our daily 
lives. By taking a well known, ordinary image that is part of our collective 
consciousness and reframing it in a way that is strange and unordinary 
to the viewer, the appropriation artist can question taken for granted 
assumptions: 
When an artist appropriates an existing image from mass 
culture, takes it out of context and places it in a gallery…, 
the viewer will often examine that image much more closely 
than she would if she found it on the pages of a magazine. 
In the process, she may discover that the values embodied 
in that image, of really ‘seeing’ it, has forced her to consider 
the operation of a process that she performs uncritically 
everyday.11
In a series of black and white pencil sketches entitled There must be 50 ways 
to kill your lover, nationally-renowned Canadian artist, Diane Thorneycroft 
depicts familiar wives from popular culture murdering their husbands.12 For 
instance, in one piece, Thorneycroft portrays Miss Piggy happily enjoying 
a martini, after just having strangled Kermit the Frog who is shown lying 
on the floor breathlessly clutching his neck. Another sketch depicts Marge 
Simpson grinning with Homer Simpson’s lifeless body on her lap. She has 
11  E. Kenly Ames, “Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for Appropriation” 
(1993) 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1473 at 1481-2 [Ames].
12  Robert Enright, “She’s known for stirring up controversy. But when Diane 
Thorneycroft sketched a murdered Mickey and Big Bird in bondage, it appeared she’d 
gone a bit too far” The Globe and Mail (31 July 2002) R1 [Enright].
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stabbed him in the chest, and a pool of blood collects beneath him. In 
showing these familiar pop cultural characters in this way, Thorneycroft is 
seeking to comment on the way in which violence is portrayed in the media, 
particularly in television programs which target younger audiences. The 
audience is challenged to view each character differently as opposed to its 
original context on television. 
Compared to other artistic mediums in which appropriation practices 
are used, appropriation in visual art is the most powerful and effective 
medium for questioning societal norms because of its non-verbal aspect.13 
Each individual viewer who interprets Thorneycroft’s violently anomalous 
sketches is free to interpret them personally, to make his or her own meaning 
out of what is conveyed. The interpretation also works on a collective level 
since the source material, here being personalities that often enter our living 
rooms, are part of our broader social consciousness: 
This ability to function on several different levels at once 
is not unique to visual arts, but, because images are more 
open to individual interpretation than verbal forms are the 
visual arts are more widely suited to conveying a message 
of social criticism to many viewers while stimulating the 
individual viewer to articulate her particular understanding 
of the message itself. 14
However, because of this visual aspect, appropriation practices in visual art 
pose the greatest challenge to copyright law compared to literary or digital 
music sampling. A writer can make discrete selections from the original source 
material in order to draw the needed reference. This is not the case with the 
visual arts, where the artist will almost always require the entire original work 
to make a sufficient reference for with which viewers will associate.15  
Beyond challenging the social norms represented by the original work, the 
particular act of appropriating the original work conveys a powerful message. 
13  Ames, supra note 11 at 1482.
14  Ibid. at 1483.
15  See generally supra note 11. 
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In this way, appropriation art is part of a broader postmodern movement 
that seeks to confront the very notions of originality and authorship that 
are fundamental to the copyright law system. Appropriation art can thus 
be seen as a discursive practice that challenges the process of creation and 
innovation, and the Lockean assumptions that often serve to justify the 
rights conferred upon authors. By using the primary work as raw material in 
the secondary work, appropriation artists undermine the romantic view of 
the author as an individual creative genius; it is a statement that the author 
does not create in a vacuum. 
In “The Author Effect after the ‘Death of the Author’: Copyright in a Post-
modern Movement”, Elton Fukumoto traces the idea of the author alongside 
the Lockean approach to individual property. He describes the romantic 
notion of the author as the idea that the author is “an individual who is 
solely responsible – and therefore exclusively deserving of credit – for the 
production of the new work”.16 The concept of authorship coincides with 
Lockean justifications for the conferral of property rights. Lockean natural 
rights theory posits that one should reap the benefits of his labour.17 Applied 
to copyright, the theory would attribute the author as the sole source 
of creativity and originality, and therefore deserved of the rights to his 
intellectual works to the exclusion of others. The act of appropriating is a 
direct challenge against the assumptions of authorship; it is a clear statement 
of defiance, asserting the artistic and creative process is necessarily a collective 
process that draws on the ideas and works of others.18
In calling his studio the ’Factory’, pop-artist Andy Warhol was said to be 
commenting on the different perspectives and ideas that make up the process 
16  Fukumoto, supra note 6 at 906.
17  See especially Carys J. Craig, “Locke, Labour & Limiting the Authors’ Rights: A 
Warning Against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law” (2002) 28 Queen’s L.J. 1 at 
para 2. Craig argues “the deontological explanation for copyright law framed in Lockean 
natural rights rhetoric and, and loaded with presumptions of moral entitlement, inevitably 
distort rather than facilitate a nuanced understanding of the copyright system”.
18  See generally Jessica Litman, “The Public Domain” (1990) 20 Emory L.J. 965 at 
1019. “Originality is a conceit, but we like it. To the extent that we are tempted to forget 
that originality is a conceit, it can be a dangerous principle on which to base a property 
system”.
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of art. Warhol’s multi-screen images of Marilyn Monroe, Elvis Presley, and 
Jackie Onassis made him a household name in American popular culture. 
Numerous artisans were involved in the creation of his pieces: one artist 
would create a silkscreen print of an image selected by Warhol, and other 
artists were involved in carrying the work to its completion. Art historians 
have often viewed Warhol’s collaborative ‘Factory’ as an emphasis that the 
artistic process is ultimately communal rather than individual.19 With this 
view in mind, a Lockean approach to authorship is turned on its head. Every 
contributor to the final product would deserve a property interest in the 
final product. Appropriation art can thus been seen as a discursive attempt 
to broaden the public domain and widen the ambit of expressions and 
intellectual works for society to flourish: 
A technique of critical discourse appropriation defies 
the very structure that copyright serves to protect. It is 
manifest a rejection of private property in favour of a more 
communitarian conception of society. Therefore, the act of 
appropriation itself imparts a political message; it reveals 
that society (and its legal system) is laden with assumptions 
that financial incentives promote individual creativity, and 
that property interests supersede society’s right of access to 
information.20
Seen in this way, appropriation art can stand in direct opposition to the 
purposes of copyright. However, as the following jurisprudence will show, 
this relationship largely depends on the accepted underlying objectives of 
a given copyright regime.  The Canadian copyright regime that has, until 
recently, taken on a more natural-rights-based objective maintains the 
opposition; an incentive-based system such as that of the United States aligns 
the valuable artistic expressions of appropriation art with the fundamental 
public purpose of copyright.
 
19  Patricia A. Krieg, “Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts” (1983) 93 Yale L.J. 
1565 at 1579. 
20  Ibid. at 1578.
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PART II – THE CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE ON 
APPROPRIATION PRACTICES
A. The Canadian Fair Dealing Exception
The current jurisprudence in respect to parody in Canada does not bode well 
for appropriation practices. On the surface it could be argued there is lack 
of certainty in the case law. However, a close examination of the Canadian 
Copyright Act makes it clear that recontextualized works such as those of 
Thorneycroft’s plainly run afoul of the copyright owner’s monopoly, and 
would not be justified under the very narrow fair dealing provisions as they 
currently stand.
The fair dealing exceptions under section 29 allow use of copyrighted works 
which would otherwise be an infringement,21 regardless of whether or not a 
license was available.  To qualify under fair dealing, the would-be infringer 
must demonstrate that (1) the dealing is for the purposes of private study, 
research, criticism or news reporting; (2) the dealing is fair; and (3) the 
source is mentioned with the name of the author. The statute itself does not 
define what constitutes ‘fair’, leaving this determination to develop through 
judicial precedence. It should be noted that the list of fair dealing purposes 
is an exhaustive list; therefore, a given dealing that is in fact ‘fair’ will not 
qualify under the fair dealing exception if it is not for the purpose of research, 
criticism or news reporting. 
To date, the leading Canadian case in respect to parody under the fair dealing 
exception is the Federal Court decision of Michelin. In 1994, the defendant 
union tried to organize a bargaining unit for three Michelin manufacturing 
plants in Nova Scotia. In an attempt to rally support, the union distributed 
21  First the copyright holder must show the defendant has infringed his copyright in a 
work. This demonstration requires that the copyright owner prove (1) the defendant had 
access to the original work and (2) the infringing work is ‘substantially similar’ to the 
copyrighted work. Caron Association des Pompiers de Montreal (1992), 42 C.P.R. (3d) 
292 (F.C.T.D.).
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leaflets that depicted a rendition of Michelin’s mascot, Bibendum, in a way 
that ridiculed the employer’s management tactics. For instance, one drawing 
showed a Michelin employee about to be crushed under the heels of an 
ominous Bibendum. Michelin immediately brought suit, alleging the union’s 
use of Bibendum was an infringement of its copyright.22 Justice Teitelbaum 
did not hesitate in finding the union had reproduced a substantial part of 
Michelin’s Bibendum design.23 This finding does not come as a surprise, 
seeing as a successful parody must refer the viewer to the original work. The 
union raised two arguments in its defence: firstly, that their use of Bibendum 
was justified under fair dealing, and in the alternative, that their inability 
to use Bibendum was a violation of their freedom of expression right under 
section 2(b) of the Charter.24
The union’s claim that its use of Bibendum was justified under the fair dealing 
exception was strictly rejected. Firstly, Justice Teitelbaum made it clear that 
the union’s parodic use failed to meet the requirements of criticism within the 
meaning of section 29: “Under the Copyright Act, ‘criticism’ is not synonymous 
with parody. Criticism requires analysis and judgment of a work that sheds 
light on the original”.25 Furthermore, a reading of the Copyright Act meant 
that the purposes enumerated under section 29 was an exhaustive list, barring 
the Court from reading in parody as a new exception on its own right. Justice 
Teitelbaum explained it was not within the Court’s role to read in parody as an 
included fair dealing exception, because such an inclusion was solely within 
Parliament’s authority.26 Thus, the fair dealing analysis was truncated by a 
failure to fit the union’s use within the purposes of section 29, largely due to 
the narrowly defined exceptions that do not include parody. 
To fully understanding the Court’s reasoning in Michelin it is integral to note 
that at the time of the decision, the sole purpose of Canadian copyright law 
22  Michelin, supra note 10 at 73.
23  Michelin, supra note 10 at 55.
24  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [Charter].
25  Michelin, supra note 10 at 66.
26  Ibid. at para. 68: “exceptions to copyright infringement should be strictly interpreted. I 
am not prepared to read in parody as a form of criticism and thus create a new exception 
under section 27(2)(a.1)”.
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was to convey a just reward to the author. The purpose of the Canadian 
copyright regime is not stated explicitly in the statute, leaving it up to the 
judiciary to respond through evolving case law. At the time of Michelin, 
the jurisprudence did not recognize the furthering of the public interest as 
a policy objective; any concept of weighing the author’s monopoly with a 
public benefit was not in the Court’s mindset. Justice Teitelbaum followed 
the earlier decision of Bishop v. Stephens,27 and held that the express purpose 
of Canadian copyright is “the protection of authors and ensuring that 
they are recompensed for their creative energies and works”.28 The Court’s 
narrow approach to fair dealing, its lack of principled reasoning in favour 
for technical requirements flows directly from this sole purpose.  This 
natural-rights, Lockean-based interpretation yields an extremely restrictive 
approach to fair dealing. It also yields values of moral entitlement, which 
materialized in Justice Teitelbaum’s obvious distaste for the union’s use of 
Bibendum in their organizing pamphlets.29 
Given the narrowly-defined sole purpose of copyright, a dismissal of the 
union’s freedom of expression argument effortlessly followed. Applying 
the test set out in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G)30 the union’s adaptation 
of Bibendum was an example of expression. In other words, the pamphlets 
met the low threshold of “attempt[ing] to convey meaning”.31 However, 
Justice Teitelbaum was adamant in concluding that the union’s expression 
incorporating Bibendum was a prohibited form of expression within the 
meaning of section 2(b) because one cannot use another’s property to assert 
a freedom of expression right: 
 
27  [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467 at 473-474. See also Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc., 
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 357 at 373.
28  Michelin, supra note 10 at 115.
















repressive copyright regime.” Ibid. at para. 76; “To accept the Defendant’s submission on 
parody [as fair dealing] would be akin to making the parody label the last refuge of the 
scoundrel…” Ibid. at para. 75.
30  [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
31  Ibid. at para. 91.
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The freedom guaranteed by the Charter is a freedom to 
express and communicate ideas without restraint, whether 
orally or in print or by other means of communication. It is 
not a freedom to use someone else’s property to do so. It gives 
no right to anyone to use someone else’s land or platform to 
make a speech, or someone else’s printing press to publish 
his ideas. It gives no right to anyone to enter and use a 
public building for such purposes.32
Since there had not been any intellectual property cases dealing with the 
issue of freedom of expression, Justice Teitelbaum relied upon real property 
cases to draw an analogy. The pre-Charter decision of Harrison v. Carswell33 
was referred to, where the defendant was unsuccessful in arguing that her 
freedom of expression right included the right to picket on the plaintiff ’s 
property. 
Had the union been successful in establishing a section 2(b) freedom of 
expression violation, the Court ruled that this violation would have been 
demonstrably justified pursuant to the Oakes test under section 1 of the 
Charter.34 It had already been well-established that the purpose of Canadian 
copyright was solely to reward the author. Justice Teitelbaum’s section 1 
analysis that followed was a direct outcome of this sole purpose. Because 
the Court found “the protection of authors and ensuring that they are 
recompensed for their creative energies and works is an important value in a 
democratic society in and of itself ”,35 the union had no chance of succeeding 
under the Charter challenge. As Carys Craig explains, “[h]aving identified 
the ultimate purpose of the Copyright Act as the protection of authors – and 
not, say, the public interest in encouraging creativity and the dissemination 
of intellectual works – the Court could hardly avoid the conclusion that 
32  Ibid. at para. 96 [emphasis added].
33  (1975), 62 D.L.R. (3d) 68.
34  R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 138-139. Once the claimant successfully establishes 















Whether there is a  pressing and substantial objective and (2) whether the means chosen 
are proportional to this objective.
35  Michelin, supra note 10 at  115.
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enforcing the author’s monopoly is a rational and efficient means of achieving 
that purpose”.36
As the law currently stands after Michelin,  the only way for an appropriation 
artist to escape liability under the Copyright Act is either to obtain a license 
from the copyright holder or to avoid a finding of infringement altogether 
by not reproducing a substantial portion of the original work. The facts 
in Michelin demonstrate the sheer impossibility of a licensing agreement. 
Undoubtedly, Michelin would not have conferred a license to the union 
allowing it to ridicule Bibendum, and to further its collective organizing 
objectives. Legal scholars have strongly criticized that Michelin effectively 
allows the copyright holder to exercise their right as a form of private 
censorship.37
Moreover, the second option, that of avoiding a prima facie finding of 
infringement, is in actuality a non-option as far as a successful appropriation 
work is concerned. As critics of Michelin have argued, a parody that does not 
substantially copy the criticized work so that the original is recognizable is 
not a successful parody.38 Parody, and appropriation works in general require 
that the viewer associate with the original work for the commentary to have 
its effect. For example, in an earlier collection of drawings and photographs 
entitled Foul Play, Thorneycroft depicted well-known children’s cartoon 
characters being hung and massacred.39 Her objective was to comment on 
the hypocritical way in which society views violence – that violence is largely 
acceptable in child’s play. After a warning from a lawyer who sat on the 
gallery board of directors, Thorneycroft decided to substitute copyrighted 














Between Freedom of Expression and Copyright” (2006) 56 U.T.L.J. 75 at 91. 
37  See especially David Fewer, “Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression 
and the Limits of Copyright in Canada” (1997) 55 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 175 at 197.















Michelin Man: Protecting Users’ Rights in the Canadian Copyright Reform Process” 
in Michael Geist, ed., In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 125.
39  Enright, supra note 12.
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no longer recognizable. This had a compromising effect on her intended 
commentary because the viewer could not properly associate with the 
reference: 
I did a drawing of a snowman that died of massive head 
injuries and it just isn’t the same thing as Goofy dying of 
massive head injuries. We know how Goofy walks and talks, 
and we can hear him in our heads, whereas the snowman 
doesn’t have a history. I can’t tell you how disappointed I 
am.40
B. The American Fair Use Doctrine
Compared to the Canadian Copyright Act, the purpose of American copyright 
is directly stated in a constitutional directive: “To promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”. 
41  The cornerstone of the American copyright system is based upon an 
incentive theory; copyright is meant to reward a monopoly right to authors 
in so far as it provides an incentive for authors to create and contribute to the 
overall objective. Although scholars have often used the rhetoric of the dual 
objectives of copyright, the constitutional directive explicitly recognizes that 
in the end, the public interest is the primary objective: 
It should not be forgotten that the Framers intended 
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By  
establishing a marketable right to use one’s expression, 
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas. 42 
The different approach to fair use in the American jurisprudence compared 
to the Canadian approach in Michelin flows directly from the fundamentally 
different purposes of the respective copyright regimes. 
40  Thorneycroft, cited in Enright, supra note 12. 
41  U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl.8 [emphasis added].
42  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539 at 539. 
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Once the copyright holder has established an infringement, the fair use 
doctrine allows the alleged infringer to nonetheless justify the use if it is seen 
as ‘fair’ and for purposes including criticism, comment, news reporting or 
teaching.  §107 then goes on to list a number of non-exhaustive factors a court 
should consider in determining whether the use is fair. A determination of 
fair use requires a case by case analysis, considering these four factors: 
the purpose and character of the use, including (1) 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
non-profit educational purposes; 
the nature of the copyrighted work; (2) 
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in (3) 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or (4) 
value of the copyrighted work. 43
Since copyright confers an economic reward to authors, there is no real 
justification for limiting uses of the copyrighted work that do not harm 
the author’s economic interest under this incentive-based system.44 The 
fair use doctrine can thus be seen as a way to allow for uses of copyright 
works to ensure that the author’s economic reward does not impair the 
ultimate objective of public benefit. Because the list of fair use examples 
is not exhaustive, a purpose that does not fit neatly under the enumerated 
examples may still be justifiable if the use is ‘fair’. 
A determination under the fair use doctrine necessitates that the courts 
undergo a balancing of interests.  Using the four factors, a judge will weigh 
the impairment to the author’s economic interest compared to the public 
43  US Copyright Act, U.S.C. tit. 17 §107 (1976).
44  For a discussion on the economic implications of appropriation art, see generally 
William M. Landes, “Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic 
Approach” (2000) 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1.
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benefit of access, keeping in mind that the public interest is the ultimate 
goal of copyright.45 Because the fair use doctrine is so flexible, it allows the 
courts to consider the underlying copyright objective of promoting the 
public interest: “Courts in passing upon particular claims of infringement 
must occasionally subordinate the copyright holder’s interest in a maximum 
financial return to the greater public interest in development of art.” 46 This 
flexibility was intended by the framers of the American Copyright Act to 
enable the judiciary to adapt the fair use doctrine to new fact situations and 
technologies.47 
American courts have welcomed parody as a valid purpose under the fair 
use doctrine and have been generally willing to recognize parody as a viable 
art forum. Irving Berlin et al. v. E.C. Publications, Inc.. was the first American 
case to recognize parody as a justifiable purpose under the fair use defence: 
“[A]s a general proposition, we believe that parody and satire are deserving 
of substantial freedom – both as entertainment and as a form of social and 
literary criticism”.48 The courts have also sought to protect parody because of 
the practical reason that a copyright holder will unlikely license a work to be 
subject to ridicule or criticism, even if this criticism were to serve a greater 
public good.49 Despite the inclusion of parody under the fair use doctrine, 
the first appropriation art case to make its way into the courts did not side 
so favourably in the public interest.50 Rogers v. Koons showed that although 
purposes of parody could be equated with fair use, appropriation practices 
didn’t necessarily fit within the paradigm of parody.51
 
 
45  Schaumann, supra note 5 at 264.
46  Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 at 307 (2d. Cir. 1966).
47  Ames, supra note 11 at 1489.
48 329 F.2d 541 at 545 (2d Cir. 1964).
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51  960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) [Rogers].
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1. Rogers v. Koons
California photographer Art Rogers brought suit against contemporary 
artist Jeff Koons, alleging Koons’ String of Puppies sculpture infringed the 
copyright of his 1980 Puppies photograph.  Koons’ sculpture was part of 
the Banality Show, exhibited at New York’s Sonnabend Gallery in 1988.  In 
fact, Koons modeled his larger than life sculpture after a postcard of Rogers’ 
photograph that he had bought in 1987 at an airport gift shop. Rogers’ 
photograph was a shot of a couple holding puppies on a park bench. Koons 
included a number of modifications to Rogers’ work. Koons’ sculpture 
was entirely blue, included changes to the couples’ facial expressions and 
depicted the couple with flowers in their hair. 52 Koons claimed his purpose 
of using Rogers’ photo was to comment on the works lack of creativity – that 
Rogers’ work was a typical, generic photograph and as such perfect fodder 
for his Banality Show: “It was only a postcard photo and I gave it spirituality, 
animation and took it to another vocabulary”. 53
In reasoning that Koons’ use was not ‘fair’, the Court focused on the 
technical requirement of parody and emphasized that a parody must 
criticize the original work.54  Whether Koons’ sculpture furthered the 
purposes of copyright was of little importance in the Court’s reasoning.  As 
one commentator remarks, “[b]y not addressing the critical purpose of the 
work, its importance as an example of kitsch and its place in art history and 
postmodernism the Court neatly sidestepped any real understanding of the 
work itself ”.55 Even more, the decision is noticeably laced with the Court’s 
value judgement of Koons’ artistic merit.56 However, the Court’s approach 
in Rogers comes as no surprise since it was the first time an American court 
had to grapple with the emerging practices of postmodern art. In the seminal 
decision of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc. that followed, the United 
States Supreme Court made a marked turn towards accepting appropriation 
52  Ibid. at 304-305.
53  Koons, cited in Lynne A. Greenberg, “The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and 
Post-Modernism” (1992) 11 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 1 at 23 [Greenberg].
54  Rogers, supra note 51 at 310.
55  Greenberg, supra note 53 at 29-30.
56  See ibid. at 303-305 where the Court describes Koons as a former Wall Street Broker 
having no skill in drawing or sculpting. In comparison, the Court notes the numerous 
galleries where Rogers’s work has been displayed. 
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practices.57 The Court’s reasoning showed that the fair use doctrine is capable 
of accommodating appropriation as a valid art form.
2. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music
In Campbell, the United States Supreme Court ruled that 2Live Crew’s 
commercial rap parody of Roy Orbison’s “O, Pretty Woman” was justified 
as fair use. It was emphasized that all of the four fair use factors should be 
weighed and considered together; not one factor is determinative of the 
issue. Therefore, the courts below erred in barring the defence of fair use 
merely on the basis that the song was a commercial parody.58 Campbell is 
integral to fitting appropriation practices within the framework of copyright, 
firstly because it introduced the ‘transformative use’ test to a determination 
of fair use, and secondly because it recognized that parody requires the use 
of pre-existing material to comment on the original work and that this use 
was justifiable due to the social value of parody. The Court adopted Justice 
Leval’s proposed test for transformative use, which asks, “whether the new 
work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead adds 
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the 
first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks it in other words, 
whether and to what extent the new work is transformative”.59 Applying the 
test to the facts of the case, the Court found that 2 Live Crew’s song, in 
juxtaposing “the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true with 
degrading taunts and a bawdy demand for sex” 60  was transformative. 
The issue of transformativeness is meant to colour the entire fair use analysis. 
The Court emphasized that the more transformative the work’s purpose, 
the less important the other three factors are against a finding of fair use.61 
For example, the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the original 
work used, is often seen as the largest hurdle for a re-contextualized work 
under the fair use analysis. However, the transformative use test adopted 
in Campbell dictates that the amount used depends on the transformative 
57  510 U.S. 569 (1994) [Campbell].
58  Ibid. at para. 10.
59  Leval, supra note 9 at 1111.
60  Campbell, supra note 57 at 17.
61  Ibid. at para.11.
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character and purpose of the use. Justice Souter wrote, “[w]hen parody 
takes aim at a particular original work, the parody must be able to ‘conjure 
up’ at least enough of the original to make the object of its critical wit 
recognizable”.62 Transformative use also accords with the fourth factor, the 
effect of the use on the original’s market. If a work is truly transformative, 
if it adds new meaning to the original, it will necessarily serve a different 
purpose compared to the original work. In that way, it is unlikely that the 
parody will serve as a market substitute for the original. Assuming the given 
parody is in fact transformative, since parody and the parodied work serve 
different functions the parody will unlikely pose a commercial threat to the 
original’s market.63 
In taking a principled approach to fair use, Campbell can be seen as a 
landmark case for opening up the possibility for appropriation art to flourish 
under the American copyright regime. Justice Souter wrote, 
[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, 
is generally furthered by the creation of transformative 
works. Such works lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s 
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of 
copyright.64 
As a critical art form that seeks to challenge social norms, the goal of 
appropriation art is necessarily to add new meaning that is totally different 
than the original work. Although it was not based on a visual artwork, cases 
that followed Campbell have shown its groundbreaking precedence in paving 
the way for the recognition of appropriation practices as not only a valid art 
form; it recognized appropriation techniques as an expressive practice that 
actually furthers the objectives of American copyright. 
 
62  Ibid. at para. 25.
63  See Nicholas B. Lewis, “Shades of Grey: Can the Copyright Fair Use Defense Adapt to 
New Re-contextualized Forms of Music and Art?” (2005) Am. U. L. Rev. 267 at 276-277 
[Lewis].
64  Campbell, supra note 57 at 11.
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Despite the progressive step taken by the Court in Campbell, proponents 
of appropriation practices were not entirely satisfied with the decision 
because it was not based on visual work, but on lyrics as a literary work. In 
respect to the amount of the original work used, the Court stated that the 
secondary artist can “‘conjure up’ at least enough of the original to make 
the object of its critical wit recognizable”.65  Commentators were concerned 
that this threshold suits the purposes of literary works, but is inadequate 
in accommodating visual artists who often use the entire original work to 
make an adequate reference:  
This factor probably presents the largest obstacle to finding 
that a re-contextualized work constitutes fair use based on 
the quantitatively large amount of copyright material that 
will generally be used. …[I]f courts are willing to accept  
re-contexualization as a valid transformative purpose 
because it is a common post-modern form of expression, 
then courts must be more lenient about allowing artists 
to use as much as is necessary to successfully convey their 
intended expressions. 66
Because Campbell was based on a literary work, the Court does not 
explicitly state than an appropriation artist may lawfully use a copyrighted 
work in its entirety. However, the following case of Mattel v. Walking 
Mountain settled this issue.  
3. Mattel v. Walking Mountain 
The impact of Campbell on the legal validity of appropriation practices was 
fully realized years later in the 2002 decision of Mattel v. Walking Mountain 
Productions.67 In 1999 Mattel brought suit against photographer Tom 
Forsythe in respect to his series of works entitled Food Chain Barbie. In the 
78 photo series, Forsythe depicts nude Barbie dolls being attacked by vintage 
appliances. For instance, in the photograph Mellow Yellow, Forsythe shows 
a naked Barbie doll spinning on a vintage Kenmore rotisserie. The doll is 
65  Ibid. at para. 25.
66  Lewis, supra note 63 at 295-296. 
67  Mattel, supra note 7.
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still wide-eyed and smiling, gleaming under the yellowish orange oven light. 
Another photograph entitled Fondue for Three portrays three Barbie heads 
floating in a fondue pot, each head being pierced by a fondue fork.68 On August 
22, 2001, the Court granted Forsythe’s motion for summary judgement, 
holding his depictions of Mattel’s Barbie constituted fair use. Not only was 
Mattel unsuccessful on appeal; the Court confirmed an order requiring that 
Mattel pay Forsythe $2 million in attorney client fees, showing its disdain for 
Mattel’s action which it found groundless and unreasonable.69
The Court was not hesitant in finding that Forsythe’s use of the Barbie dolls 
was fair use, as evidenced by the granting of summary judgement. Aided by 
expert testimony from aesthetic scholars, the Court accepted Forsythe was 
commenting on the gender roles in society and the effect Barbie has had in 
shaping our social norms. In this way, Forsythe gave a whole new context for 
viewers to associate with Barbie in a different way, giving the dolls an entirely 
new meaning.70 In Food Chain Barbie a viewer’s understanding of Barbie as 
a household icon is transformed. The Court describes Forsythe’s message 
as a “critique [of] the objectification of women associated with ‘Barbie’ and 
to lambaste the conventional beauty myth and the societal acceptance of 
women as objects because that is what Barbie embodies”.71
The decision goes to great lengths to emphasize that the artistic merit of 
Forsythe’s work is of no relevance under the fair use analysis. Instead, the 
Court relied heavily on Justice Holmes’s often cited dictum in Bleistein:  “it 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a work]”.72   It was of no 
concern whether or not Forsythe’s work was in good or bad taste. Mattel 
tried to introduce evidence to show that the general public did not view 
68  Tom Forsythe, “Food Chain Barbie, R Prints, Edition of 450”, online: Tom Forsythe 
Artsurdism, http://creativefreedomdefense.org/Results.cfm?category=6.
69  Mattel, supra note 7.
70  “I put them in a blender, with the implication they’re going to get chewed up, but no 
matter what, they just keep smiling. That became an interesting commentary on just how 
false the image is”. Forsythe, cited in Kembrew McLeod, Freedom of Expression®, (New 
York: Doubleday 2005) at 143.
71  Mattel, supra note 7.
72  Bleistein, supra note 2.
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Forsythe’s photographs as parody. It had taken surveys at various shopping 
malls, gauging people’s reactions after being shown Forsythe’s works. This 
survey evidence was frowned upon by the Court: “Use of surveys in assessing 
parody would allow majorities to determine the parodic nature of a work 
and possibly silence artistic creativity. Allowing majorities to determine 
whether a work is parody would be greatly at odds with the purpose of the 
fair use exception”.73 Indeed, the Court was careful to heed the warnings 
of Justice Holmes; the reasoning is not coloured by opinions as to artistic 
merit, compared to the earlier case of Rogers.  
Perhaps the greatest strength of the Court’s reasoning was its recognition 
that the third fair use factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used, poses a unique obstacle for visual appropriation art. Here, the Court 
noted, “[b]ecause the copyright material is a doll design and the infringing 
work is a photograph containing the doll, Forsythe, short of severing 
the doll, must add to it by creating a context around it and capturing the 
context in the photograph”.74 It found that the particular visual medium 
used by Forsythe required the use of the entire Barbie doll. Furthermore, 
Mattel’s argument that Forsythe exceeded the necessary amount was strictly 
rejected: “We do not require parodic works to take the absolute minimum 
amount of the copyrighted work possible.”75 The Court was merely applying 
the transformative use test as set in Campbell to a visual work – that the 
amount of the original work used depends on the character of the use, the 
character in this case being a visual work. This settled the uncertainty left 
after Campbell. It was a clear affirmation that an appropriation artist who 
adopts the entire copyrighted work in order to make a successful reference 




75  Ibid. 
















which the [work’s] overriding purpose and character is to parody the original or, in 
contrast, the likelihood that the parody may serve as a market substitute for the original.” 
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Throughout the Court’s reasoning, it is evident that the overall purpose of 
promoting public access to intellectual works is a guiding concern. Even 
more, the Court is not hesitant to incorporate free speech values into its 
analysis of fair use and cautions that allowing Mattel’s claim would be 
effectively allowing private censorship: 
The public benefit in allowing artistic creativity and social 
criticism to flourish is great…No doubt, Mattel would be 
less likely to grant a license to an artist that intends to create 
art that criticises and reflects negatively on Barbie’s image. 
It is not in the public’s interest to allow Mattel complete 
control over the kinds of artistic works that use Barbie as a 
reference for criticism and comment.77 
This decision is an unmistaken confirmation by the American courts that 
commercial and pop cultural images can be lawfully appropriated so long as 
the use is fair, bearing in mind their transformative use. It also shows that in 
its application, the transformative use test is a useful, flexible measure that 
allows the courts to be mindful of the public purpose objective of copyright 
law rather than being preoccupied with technicalities. 
4. Blanch v. Koons
The recent American decision dealing with appropriation art, Blanch v. 
Koons, offers the most promising reasoning in favour of accommodating 
appropriation art under copyright law.78 In 2005, photographer Andrea 
Blanch filed suit against Koons for violating her copyright in a photograph 
she had taken that appeared in Allure magazine.79 Koons scanned the photo 
Silk Sandals, took out the background, and superimposed the image on an 
inverted slant onto his Niagara painting. Niagara was commissioned in 
2000 by Deutsche Bank and the Guggenheim Foundation as part of a seven 
painting series called Easyfun-Ethereal. The painting shows four pairs of 
women’s feet dangling over images of desserts and treats, with the waterfall 
as a backdrop. In a court filing, Koons’ lawyer John Koegel wrote, “[Niagara] 
77  Mattel, supra note 7.
78  No. 05-6433 (2nd Circuit, October 26, 2006) [Blanch].
79  396 F. Supp 2d 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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is an entirely new artistic work…that comments on and celebrates society’s 
appetites and indulgences as reflected in and encouraged by a ubiquitous 
barrage of advertising and promotional images of food, entertainment, 
fashion and beauty”.80
The Court’s reasoning in Blanch is yet another encouraging step towards 
the validity of appropriation art under the American copyright regime. It 
picks up on the principles set out Campbell, showing that the transformative 
use is capable of accommodating appropriation when applied flexibly 
and guided by the overall public purpose of copyright. In assessing the 
transformativeness of Koons’ use, Justice Sack compared the purpose of 
Koons’ use with that of Blanch’s photograph. For instance, Koons testified, 
“I want the viewer to think about his or her personal experience with these 
objects, products, and images and at the same time gain new insight into 
how these affect our lives”,81 and “by recontextualizing these fragments as 
I do, I try to compel the viewer to break out of the conventional way of 
experiencing a particular appetite as mediated by mass media”.82 When 
viewed alongside Blanch’s purpose in her photograph, it is clear that the two 
works are totally divergent: “I wanted to show some sort of erotic sense to 
get more of a sexuality to the photographs”83.  Judge Sack did not hesitate 
in finding Niagara was a transformative use of Blanch’s photograph. The 
testimony of the two artists readily showed Koons’ work as adding insight 
and new understanding to Blanch’s original work. Because appropriation art 
has an underlying purpose of critiquing the source material that is recast, it 
will likely satisfy the comparing purpose analysis exemplified in this case.  
Perhaps the strongest arsenal this decision provides appropriation artist is 
the Court’s disregard for the technical requirements of parody as set out 
in Rogers. The Court in Rogers was adamant that in order for a work to 
qualify as a parody “the copied work must be, at least in part, an object of the 
80  “Koons Wins Copyright Lawsuit ”Artnet News ( 19 January 2006), online: artnet 
Magazine, http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/news/artnetnews/artnetnews1-19-06.asp.
81  Blanch, supra note 78 at 17.
82  Ibid. at 5-6.
83  Ibid. at 17
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parody”.84 This requirement did not preclude the Court from a finding of fair 
use in this instance. That Niagara did not comment on Blanch’s photograph 
per se did not pose as a technical obstacle against Koon’s defence because the 
Court found Niagara fell under the heading of satire. As the list of purposes 
under §107 is not exhaustive, parody is not the only classification on which 
an artist can rely upon for a defence of fair use. Rather than requiring that 
the secondary work critique the primary work, satire “can stand on its own 
two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing”.85  
The adopted test for satire is much broader than that of parody, and asks 
“whether Koons had a genuine creative rationale for borrowing Blanch’s 
image rather than merely to get attention or to avoid the drudgery of coming 
up with something fresh”.86 This justification requirement may appear to be 
an onerous threshold, but the Court’s reasoning shows that in respect to 
artistic expression it is a very realistic threshold to meet. Again, quoting the 
words of Justice Holmes from Bleistein, Judge Sack explained that it is not 
within the Court’s role or expertise to judge the merits of Koons’ artistry or 
his painting: “[I]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained 
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of a work, 
outside the narrowest and most obvious limits”.87 
The Court in Niagara is less concerned with pigeon-holing requirements, 
and more concerned with using the transformative use test as a flexible tool 
to further the public interest purpose of American copyright law. Judge Sack 
was careful not to undergo a quality assessment of whether Niagara was a 
work of art and, instead, gave considerable weight to Koons’ explanation for 
his choice in referencing Silk Sandals:
Although the legs in ‘Silk Sandals’ might seem prosaic, 
I considered them to be necessary for inclusion in my 
painting rather than legs I might have photographed 
myself…To me, the legs depicted in the Allure photograph 
84  Rogers, supra note 51 at 310. 
85  Blanch, supra note 78 at 23 [emphasis added].
86  Ibid at 24.
87  Bleistein, supra note 2 at 251. 
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are a fact in the world, something that everyone experiences 
constantly…By using a fragment of the Allure photograph 
in my painting, I thus comment upon the culture and 
attitudes promoted and embodied in Allure Magazine.88  
Judge Sack wrote, “[i]t seems clear enough to us that Koons’ use of a slick 
fashion photograph allows him to satirize life as it appears when seen through 
the prism of slick fashion photography”.89 
The validity of appropriation art under the American copyright regime 
has clearly evolved from the rigid stance taken in the first case of Rogers. 
Since Campbell introduced Justice Leval’s transformative consideration 
to the fair use analysis, it has provided a useful tool that allows the courts 
to be guided by the ultimate public purpose of American copyright. If a 
work is transformative, if it “adds something new, with a further purpose 
or different character,”90 society would surely benefit from its added value 
and meaning. Furthermore, the jurisprudence shows the American courts 
are more willing to take on a principled approach to fair use, focusing on 
the dissemination of works to further the purpose of copyright rather than 
fixating over technicalities and strict definitions. Regardless of whether the 
secondary work mimics the primary work, the work will still be open to 
a fair use defence under a broader heading of satire. An artist who faces 
the difficult judgement call as to whether or not he or she should adopt a 
reference to a copyrighted work can find comfort in the courts’ growing 
acceptance of this postmodern artistic practice. While the situation in 
America has moved progressively towards a more user-friendly approach, 
Michelin is still the leading case law in Canada. As it currently stands, the 
Canadian jurisprudence is even more restrictive than Rogers; and Canadian 
artists have little to find comfort in. 
88  Koons cited in supra note 78 at 24.
89  Ibid at 24.
90  Campbell, supra note 57 at 11.
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PART III: AVENUES OF REFORM – TOWARDS  
AN ARTIST-FRIENDLY STANDARD
It has been over ten years since Michelin silenced any chance of a judicially-
imposed parody exemption under Canadian fair dealing. Recent decisions by 
the Supreme Court of Canada give reason to believe that Michelin would be 
decided much differently by the courts today, regardless of any parliamentary 
reform to the current fair dealing provisions. It could be strongly argued that 
Canadian courts would approach an appropriation art fact situation such 
as Michelin very differently. Firstly, several legal scholars have convincingly 
argued that the Federal Court erred in its freedom of expression analysis in 
Michelin. Also, in light of the recent turn in Canadian copyright pioneered by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in the groundbreaking decisions of Théberge 
v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc.91 and CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law 
Society of Upper Canada, 92 there is good reason to reconsider the judicial 
authority of Michelin. However, despite the recent turn by the Supreme Court 
of Canada, the following analysis will show that the most viable solution for 
appropriation artists is through parliamentary reform. 
Did the Court Err in Michelin?
Legal scholars have been quick to condemn the Court’s section 2(b) Charter 
analysis in Michelin, primarily because of the ease to which the Court 
dismisses the union’s claim. In particular, it has been strongly argued that 
the Court failed to fully appreciate the conceptual difference between real 
property and intellectual property rights. In “Deflating the Michelin Man – 
Protecting User’s Rights in the Canadian Copyright Reform Process”, Jane 
Bailey makes notice of the unique non-rivalrous character of intellectual 
property rights. Bailey writes, “Unlike real property, however, copyright 
material is non-rivalrous – your use of my copyrighted material does not 
preclude me from using it”.93 The Court did not come to terms with this 
distinction. Instead, Justice Teitelbaum quickly silenced any issue, writing, 
91  (2002), 17 C.P.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.) [Théberge]. 
92  [2002] 1 S.C.R. 339 [CCH].
93  Bailey, supra note 38 at 143.
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“just because the [copyright] is intangible, it should not be any less worthy 
of protection as a full property right”.94 
Legal scholar Carys Craig also takes issue with the Court’s dismissive 
stance, paying particular attention to the physical characteristics of real 
property compared to that of intellectual property.  Craig notes that there 
is nothing inherently expressive about ownership in land. In comparison, 
with copyrighted works the content that makes up the right is expressive in 
itself. There is a difference between the physical ownership over a book as 
property, and its content as a literary, expressive work.  Copyrighted works as 
expressions of ideas are exactly that – they are rights over expression. Craig 
explains, “[v]iewed in this way, the difference between copyright’s intangible 
subject matter and the tangible object of, say, land law is fundamentally 
relevant to determining the limits of copyright in light of freedom of 
expression values”.95 
Furthermore, commentators have consistently maintained that the Court 
in Michelin erred in ignoring the constitutional supremacy of the Charter.96 
According to section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Constitution, 
including the Charter is the “supreme law of Canada”.97 Any law that is 
inconsistent with the Charter is of no force or effect. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has explicitly held that proprietary interests are not protected under 
the Charter.98 Therefore, the employer’s copyright interest did not merit 
Charter protection that would justify overriding the union’s freedom of 
expression right. By giving the employer’s copyright and, in turn, the Copyright 
Act greater status than a constitutionally enshrined freedom of expression 
right, the Court in Michelin made a serious error that could warrant judicial 
review.  Bailey explains, “foreclosing the protection of certain expression 
under section 2(b) on the basis that it conflicts with unentrenched property 
rights directly contradicts the concept of constitutional paramountcy – 
94  Michelin, supra note 10 at 103.
95  Craig, supra note 36 at 93. 
96  See generally supra note 37, and supra note 36.
97  Constituion Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982 c. 11, s. 
52(1) [Constitution Act].
98  Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at para. 96.
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with the unenshrined property right seemingly taking precedence over the 
enshrined right to free expression”.99
The Developments in Théberge and CCH – New Hope for 
Appropriation Artists?
In Théberge, the Supreme Court of Canada finally settled the longstanding 
debate in respect to the policy objectives of Canadian copyright. The 
judiciary, responding to a lack of consensus and clarity within the Act itself, 
rejected the sole purpose objective that had subsisted since the inception of 
the Act. The Court declared that a proper interpretation of the Copyright Act 
reveals the dual purposes of the Act:
The Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance between 
promoting the public interest in the encouragement 
and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and 
obtaining a just reward for the creator…The proper balance 
among these and other public policy objectives lies not only 
in recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving due weight 
to their limited nature… In interpreting the Copyright Act, 
courts should strive to maintain an appropriate balance 
between these two goals.100
Proponents of users’ rights saw the Court’s affirmative statement in Théberge 
as a significant turn in Canadian copyright, a turn that would be realized in 
the decision of CCH that shortly followed. 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s expansive approach to fair dealing in CCH 
followed logically from the balancing of the public interest and creator’s 
rights. Building on the dual principles established in Théberge, the Court 
adopted a purposive interpretation of the fair dealing provisions, asserting, 
“The fair dealing exception is perhaps more properly understood as an 
integral part of the Copyright Act than simply a defence….The fair dealing 
exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user’s right. In 
99  Bailey, supra note 38 at 142.
100  Theberge, supra note 91 at 30-31.
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order to maintain a proper balance between the rights of a copyright owner 
and a users’ interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively”.101 The Court 
provided a framework for determining what constitutes ‘fair’ within the 
meaning of section 29 that is similar to the four factors set out in §107 of 
the United States Copyright Act. These factors include the purpose of the 
dealing, the character of the dealing, the amount of dealing, and the effect of 
dealing on the original work.102
Many commentators have rejoiced in the potential impact of the two 
pioneering decisions. For example, Joliffe, Sartorio and Chenowith applaud 
both the dual policy objectives and the expansive approach to fair dealing 
as “the clearest recognition from a Canadian court that copyright is an 
instrument of social utility. There are dangers both in overcompensating 
and undercompensating the intellectual property holder”103. The writers 
note that CCH puts Canadian copyright objectives in-line with those set 
out in the American Constitution. However, while the dual purposes are 
indeed a move towards the incentive approach, the decision of Théberge 
does not put Canadian copyright objectives at complete parity with 
American copyright.
Firstly, it should be noted that the ultimate goal of American copyright is 
the promotion of intellectual works for the public good. The monopoly right 
conferred to authors is only justified in so far as it provides an incentive to 
further this overall objective.104 Théberge mandates that author’s rights and the 
public interest are balanced as equal and competing interests. Consequently, 
Canadian copyright jurisprudence still lacks the understanding of copyright 
as only a vehicle towards the ultimate public good in having access to 
creative works. Put simply, copyright should be seen as a means to an 
end. As Craig argues, “[t]he copyright owner’s rights exist only through 
that public interest and cannot be justified in spite of it”.105 For the artist, 
101  C.C.H., supra note 92 at 48 [emphasis added].
102  Ibid. para 53-60.
103  R. Scott Joliffe, Kevin J. Sartorio, & Sarah Chenoweth, “The Dawn of a New Era of 
Balance in Canadian Copyright Law” (2005) 22 C.I.P.R. 17 at 23.
104  See Part II, above, for more on this topic.
105  Craig, supra note 36 at 111.
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this fundamental conceptual difference will impede a full appreciation of 
appropriation practices by Canadian courts. Teresa Scassa warns that the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s dual purpose objective is just that – it is settled 
by judge-made case law and not an affirmative statutory statement as is the 
case in the United States. She writes, “[t]he balancing approach, while in 
some cases offering greater scope to the interpretation of rights of users, is an 
extremely imprecise tool that can easily be wielded by different judges with 
very different outcomes. It should also not be forgotten that the balancing 
approach is court-mandated, and not set out in the constitution as it is in the 
United States”.106 What is needed is a clear, unequivocal pronouncement in 
the statute itself, through statutory reform. 
Secondly, no matter how broadly and expansively the fair dealing exceptions 
are interpreted by Canadian courts, the wording of the Copyright Act itself 
has not budged. The judiciary can only work within the bounds of the 
narrow boundaries of the Copyright Act. Judge Teitelbaum’s dictum that 
the judiciary cannot encroach on Parliament’s role to create new purposes 
under fair dealing still rings true today.107 Craig explains, “[t]he onus remains 
upon Parliament to continuously develop new exceptions in the face of new 
challenges; the role of the courts is to assess whether the case at hand meets 
the specific demands of the fair dealing defence”.108 Consequently, an artist’s 
use of a copyrighted work may well constitute ‘fair’ dealing within the factors 
set out in CCH, but such a victory is futile because she must first fit the 
use within the exhaustive purposes. This is compared to the United States, 
where courts concentrates on whether a use is ‘fair’ through applying the 
four factors instead of judicial pigeon-holing as to the purpose of use. Scassa 
cautions that the recent developments are not the end all solution: 
The cases do demonstrate a strong commitment by the 
Supreme Court of Canada to take into account users 
106  Teresa Scassa, “Users’ Rights in the Balance: Recent Developments in Copyright Law 
at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2005) 11 C.I.P.R. 133 at 135.
107  Michelin, supra note 10 at 381.
108  Carys Craig, “The Changing Face of Fair Dealing in Canadian Copyright Law: A 
Proposal for Legislative Reform” in Michael Geist, ed., In the Public Interest: The Future 
of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 437 at 456.
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interests, and to some extent, broader societal interest in 
interpreting and applying the Act. The decisions, however, 
cannot be regarded as an unequivocal victory for users’ 
rights in Canada…Any balance struck in interpreting 
the Act is substantially affected by the balance (or lack of 
balance) crafted in the legislation by Parliament.109
Théberge and CCH represent a positive turn for appropriation artists. 
However, they are not a substitute to much-needed parliamentary copyright 
reform.
For the appropriation artist, the greatest clout that comes out of the recent 
Supreme Court of Canada developments lies in a prospective Charter 
challenge of the Copyright Act. Although a full examination of the relationship 
between freedom of expression and copyright is beyond the scope of this 
paper, the possibility of a Charter challenge merits a brief discussion.110 The 
Copyright Act has largely avoided Charter scrutiny, apart from the case of 
Michelin where the freedom of expression issue was easily dismissed by 
the Court.  Scholars have fiercely argued that as an act of Parliament, the 
Copyright Act must comply with principles of the Charter including the 
freedom of expression right. Craig explains, “Section 2(b) of the Charter 
constitutionally guarantees freedom of expression, while the Copyright 
Act creates an exclusionary interest over the expression of an idea fixed in 
tangible form. Put in this way, the question is not whether the Copyright Act 
is constitutionally questionable, but, rather, how can it be anything but?”111 
Craig attributes this avoidance to an assumption that the Act already 
encompasses mechanisms to accord Canadian copyright with freedom of 
expression, including the fair dealing provisions and the idea and expression 
109  Scassa, supra note 106 at 141.
110  For an expanded discussion on the relationship between freedom of expression and 
copyright, see generally supra note 37. See also supra note 19 and supra note 36. 
111  Craig, supra note 36 at 77; see also Bailey, supra note 38 at 141. “[S]ince copyright 
exists in Canada only as a result of its statutory creation in the Act, the existence of 
any such property right is dependent upon the constitutional validity of the legislation 
purporting to grant it”.
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dichotomy.112 Given the fact that the monopoly right conferred amounts to 
a private censorship, as was the case in Michelin, these assumptions clearly 
require revisiting. A section 2(b) Charter challenge against the Copyright Act 
itself has a greater likelihood of success in a judicial milieu that recognizes the 
dual purposes of copyright. For instance, in Michelin the Court identified the 
pressing and substantial objective of the Copyright Act as solely “the protection 
of authors and ensuring that they are recompensed for their creative energies 
and works”.113 In light of the decision of Théberge the public interest objective 
would also have to be considered as pressing and substantial for the purposes 
of the Oakes analysis. This dual purpose makes an incredible difference in the 
balancing process mandated under Oakes: 
The key issue would turn on the minimal impairment inquiry – that the 
Copyright Act fails to strike an appropriate balance between authors’ rights 
and users’ rights. Given that fair dealing provisions do not include parody 
as a justifiable purpose, it could be successfully argued that the Act is under-
inclusive. The potential of a Charter challenge in widening the scope of the 
fair dealing provisions is explained by Bailey: 
The emphasis in Théberge on users’ rights and the related 
importance of access to and use of others’ expression in 
the innovation process, could well be used to suggest the 
user rights articulated in the Act are under-inclusive. To 
the extent, for example, that fair dealing does not include 
copying expression that is as socially and politically 
important as whistle blowing and parody, the Act may well 
restrict more expression than is reasonably necessary.114
Fewer suggests that a likely remedy would be the reading in of the phrase ‘for 
purposes including’, and goes as far as arguing the determination of ‘fair’ be 
expanded “to embrace otherwise infringing uses that nonetheless lie close to 














Between Freedom of Expression and Copyright” (2006) 56 U.T.L.J. 75 at 77.
113  Michelin, supra note 10 at 115.
114  Bailey, supra note 38 at 151.
115  Fewer, supra note 37 at 233-234.
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Despite a possible Charter challenge of the Copyright Act, such a route has 
little practical chance of success. Charter litigation is extremely lengthy and 
expensive to fund. It would likely take years before appropriation artists get 
a final and favourable decision. Again, the lack of recourse appropriation 
artists have, in spite of the promising decisions by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, shows the need for parliamentary reform. It is incumbent on 
Parliament to make the necessary changes so that the Copyright Act reflects 
the positive turn made by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Need for Statutory Reform: Moving Towards the American 
Fair Use Standard
It is glaringly apparent that the fair dealing exceptions must be remodelled 
to reflect the spirit of the Court’s ruling in Théberge and CCH. Until then, 
Canadian artists who use postmodern appropriation practices will continue 
to work under a regime that stifles creative expression, and the public will 
continue to fail to benefit from these socially-integral works. Bill C-60, 
introduced in June of 2005 as proposals to copyright reform, was completely 
silent on any expansion of the fair use exceptions.116 The government has 
completely disregarded the Court’s dictum in CCH, that fair dealing must be 
interpreted broadly as a ‘user’s right’.117 This comes as a huge disappointment, 
as felt by a coalition of Canadian artists who go by the name of ‘Appropriation 
Art’. The following is an excerpt from their June 2006 open letter to the then 
Minister of Industry, Maxime Bernier and the then Minister of Canadian 
Heritage, Bev Oda,
Artists and other creators require Certainty of Access. 
Artists who use appropriation in their practice, rely on 
Canada’s fair dealing exception to create. Fair dealing is a 
narrow right, perhaps at times too narrow to support this 
work. Creators should enjoy the support of the law, and not 
have to work under conditions of uncertainty. The work 
we speak of here does not compete with that of its subject, 
nor does the value of this work derive from the value of its 
116 Bill C-60, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., 2005. 
117  C.C.H., supra note 92 at 48.
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subject. The time has come for the Canadian government 
to consider replacing fair dealing with a broader defence, 
such as fair use, that will offer artists the certainty they 
require to create.118
Bill C-60 was not formally adopted before the dissolution of the Liberal 
government in 2005, and a new bill has yet to be tabled. In January, 2007, 
Michael Geist gave a presentation on fair use to Canadian Heritage’s 
Copyright Policy Branch. Geist’s presentation, entitled ‘The Case for Fair 
Use in Canada’, argued that Canada should adopt a fair use standard such as 
the United States. He raised seven reasons for the expansion of fair dealing, 
such as a consistency with the Supreme Court of Canada’s conception of 
copyright, and a consistency with emerging artistic needs and practices.119
Aligning the Canadian fair dealing provision with the American fair use 
doctrine is not a flawless, end- all solution. American artists who employ 
appropriation practices in their works are still encumbered by threats of 
expensive litigation, as evidenced by the hefty $2 million in legal fees incurred 
by Forsythe in Mattel.120 Moreover, the fundamental question of whether a 
dealing is ‘fair’ is a case-by-case, fact-specific inquiry that ultimately comes 
down to a particular judge’s determination. This renders the  determination 
of ‘fair’ susceptible to a judge’s subjective predilections of  what constitutes 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ art as was seen in the judicial reasoning in Michelin and 
Rogers. 121 Despite these inadequacies, a fair dealing provision akin to the 
American fair use doctrine would nonetheless be an enormous benefit to 
appropriation artists in Canada who currently have little recourse under the 
existing Copyright Act. The case law on fair use in respect to appropriation 
practices has already been widely established in the United States. The 
Canadian jurisprudence would only have to gain from the principled 
118  Open letter from Appropriation Art: A Coalition of Art Professionals to Minister of 
Industry Maxime Bernier and Minister of Canadian Heritage Bev Oda (6 June, 2006) on 
Appropriation Art online: Appropriation Art, http://www.appropriationart.ca/?page_id=3.
119 Michael Geist, “The Case for Fair Use in Canada: Michael Geist Blog (25 January, 
2007), online: Michael Geist’s Blog http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/1637/125/.
120  Mattel, supra note 7.
121  For a thorough discussion on a tendency of judges to assess the quality and merits of 
artistic works, see generally Christine Haight Farley, “Judging Art” (2004) Tul. L. Rev. 
805. 
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reasoning that has evolved since Rogers. A fair use standard would certainly 
open up the opportunity for Canadian courts to follow the rather progressive 
stance espoused by the American courts in Mattel and Blanch.
Furthermore, as postmodern artistic practices gain recognition in aesthetic 
studies, American courts are now giving credence to expert testimony of 
art historians and philosophers to help facilitate informed decision-making. 
In Mattel the Court relied upon an expert witness report by Douglas 
Nickel, an art history expert and curator at the San Francisco Museum 
of Modern Art. Nickel’s report provided an account of the traditional 
practices of contemporary artists, serving as an insightful backdrop to a 
full understanding of Forsythe’s works. Just as psychologists are relied upon 
by courts for a better understanding of an accused’s sanity, so can aesthetic 
scholars be relied upon for a better understanding of artistic practices.122 
An artist’s legal counsel would be astute to take advantage of experts who 
are well-versed in the aesthetic discipline. In the famous words of Justice 
Holmes, this sort of expert testimony would help a judge learn “the new 
language in which [the] author spoke”.123
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is a trite observation that artists are integral to society, to understanding 
the intricacies of our values, beliefs, and even our faults. Noted Canadian 
scholar, Marshall McLuhan, once wrote, “I think of art, at its most significant, 
as a DEW line, a Distant Early Warning system that can always be relied 
on to tell the old culture what is beginning to happen to it”.124 The current 
Canadian copyright regime is failing both artists and the society that ought 
to benefit from creative works. Despite a clear decree by the Supreme Court 
122  Ibid. at 840.
123  Bleistein, supra  note 2 at 251.
124  Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1964) at 22.
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of Canada, the only realistic avenue towards allowing appropriation practices 
is through parliamentary reform akin to the American fair use doctrine. 
Until then, the Distant Early Warning system will continue to be crippled by 
a regime that should instead help it flourish. 
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